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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; infractions-mandatory release provisions
Penal Code §853.5 (amended).
AB 2296 (McAlister); STATS 1980, Ch 238
Support: California Highway Patrol; Office of the Governor, Legal
Affairs Unit
Under existing law, a person arrested for an infraction' may be re-
leased if the arresting officer or his or her superior determines that the
person should be released and a written notice to appear is signed by
the arrestee.2 Chapter 238 requires that when a person is arrested for
an infraction, the arresting officer must release the person if a driver's
license or other satisfactory evidence of identity is presented and a writ-
ten promise to appear is signed.3 The arrestee may be taken into cus-
tody only upon his or her refusal to present the proper identification or
to sign the promise to appear.4 Chapter 238 provides a uniform proce-
dure for all cases in which an infraction is involved5 except for viola-
tions of specific Vehicle Code sections,6 when an appearance before a
magistrate is mandatory or is left to the discretion of the arresting of-
ficer.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §19c (definition of infraction).
2. See id. §853.5. See generally id. §853.6 (release upon arrest for misdemeanor).
3. See id. §853.5.
4. See id.
5. See id.; STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1979 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 9-6a.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §853.5; CAL. VEH. CODE §§40302 (mandatory appearance before
a magistrate for (1) failure to present a driver's license, (2) refusal to sign a promise to appear,
(3) demand for an immediate appearance, or (4) driving while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs), 40303 (optional appearance before a magistrate for specified offenses).
7. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§40302, 40303.
Criminal Procedure; prosecutions
Government Code §26500 (amended); Penal Code §§853.6, 853.6a,
853.9 (amended).
SB 1890 (Rains); STATS 1980, Ch 1094
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; Department of
Finance; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Selected 1980 California Legislation ---
Criminal Procedure
Chapter 1094 modifies the statutory procedure for filing a written
notice to appear that is issued to a person arrested for a misdemeanor.'
Prior law required that the officer preparing the notice fie the duplicate
notice with the magistrate specified therein.' Chapter 1094 now re-
quires that the officer file the duplicate notice to appear and the under-
lying police report with the prosecuting attorney 3 who, in general, will
be the district attorney.4 The prosecutor then must determine, in the
exercise of the discretion conferred on him or her by law,5 whether a
prosecution should be initiated.6 The prosecuting attorney is author-
ized to initiate a prosecution by filing either the notice to appear or a
formal complaint with the appropriate magistrate within five days of
the arrest.7 If a prosecution will not be initiated, Chapter 1094 requires
the prosecutor to notify the arrested person of that decision.8 Thus, by
channeling notices to appear through the prosecuting attorney, rather
than requiring direct filing with the magistrate, Chapter 1094 appar-
ently allows greater discretion by the prosecuting attorney in the initia-
tion of misdemeanor prosecutions. 9
I. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e) with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 270, §1, at 562.
2. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 270, §1, at 562.
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e).
4. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §26500. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(a) (requiring that the
notice to appear issued to a minor arrested for a nonfelony violation of the Fish and Game Code
be filed with the prosecuting attorney rather than with the juvenile court clerk or referee or the
juvenile traffic officer).
5. See People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 207, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645, 655 (1972).
See note 4 supra.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6(e).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Compare id. with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 270, §1, at 562.
Criminal Procedure; presence of defendant at preliminary
hearing, misdemeanor probable cause
Penal Code §§991, 1043.5 (new).
AB 2931 (Harris); STATS 1980, Ch 1379
Support: Attorney General of California; California District Attor-
neys Association; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Under existing law, a felony' or misdemeanor2 trial may proceed in
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §17(a) (definition of felony).
2. See id. §17(b) (definition of misdemeanor).
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certain instances when the defendant is voluntarily absent;3 however,
prior to the enactment of Chapter 1379 there were no similar guidelines
governing procedure at preliminary hearings when the defendant was
absent.4 Chapter 1379 provides that a preliminary hearing may con-
tinue in the defendant's absence if the hearing was commenced in the
defendant's presence and either (1) the defendant has been removed
from the hearing because of continued behavior so disruptive of the
court that the hearing cannot be carried on when the defendant is pres-
ent, or (2) the defendant is otherwise voluntarily absent from a hear-
ing pursuant to prosecution of an offense not punishable by death.5
The preliminary hearing may proceed for numerous purposes, includ-
ing: (1) holding the defendant to answer; (2) filing an information;
or (3) discharging the defendant.6 A defendant who has been re-
moved because of disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful conduct may
reclaim his or her right to be present by conduct consistent with the
decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial pro-
ceedings.7 Moreover, Chapter 1379 does not limit the existing law
which provides that a felony defendant may waive his or her right to be
present at a preliminary hearing, by executing a written waiver in open
court that is approved by the defense counsel and filed with the court,
unless he or she is specifically directed by the court to be personally
present.8
Additionally, Chapter 1379 codifies existing case law that requires a
judicial determintion of probable cause9 as a precondition to any sig-
nificant pretrial restraint of liberty,10 including instances when a de-
fendant pleading not guilty to a misdemeanor charge is still in custody
3. See id. §1043(a), (b), (c), (d). See generally United States v. Cureton, 396 F.2d 671, 675-
76 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Malloy, 41 Cal. App. 3d 944, 954, 116 Cal. Rptr. 592, 598 (1974);
People v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 379, 383-85, 111 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411-12 (1973) (felony trials
continued in defendants' absences); Beasley v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 1025-26,
108 Cal. Rptr. 637, 640-41 (1973) (misdemeanor trial continued in defendant's absence).
4. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1379, §2 at - (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §1043.5) (defendant
absent at preliminary hearing). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §738; B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Preliminary Examination §132 (nature and purpose) (Supp. 1978); Com-
ment, Grand Jury System Modofed" Hawkins v. Superior Court, 6 W. ST. U.L. REv., 343 (1979).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1043.5(b)(2).
6. See id.
7. See id. §1043.5(c). See generally People v. Cox, 81 Cal. App. 3d, Supp. 1, 146 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1978).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§977, 1043(d), 1043.5(d); Ernst v. Municipal Court, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 710, 719-20, 163 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867-68 (1980); People v. Green, 95 Cal. App. 3d 991,
1002-03, 157 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526-27 (1979).
9. See People v. Municipal Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d 11, 15, 155 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1979);
People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 667, 511 P.2d 609, 612, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660 (1973).
10. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Probable Cause Necessary for Signofcant Restraint on Liberty §114A
(Supp. 1978).
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at the time of arraignment. 1 At the arraignment and upon motion by
the defendant or the defendant's counsel, the magistrate must immedi-
ately determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a public
offense has been committed by the defendant, 12 unless the court grants
a continuance for good cause not to exceed three court days.' 3 To de-
termine whether or not probable cause exists, the magistrate must con-
sider any warrant of arrest with supporting affidavits' 4 and the sworn
complaint together with any additional documents or reports incorpo-
rated with this evidence by reference, 5 which if based on information
and belief,'6 must contain the basis for that information. 7 The magis-
trate must also consider any other documents of comparable reliabil-
ity.18 After examination of these documents, if the court finds there is
probable cause to believe the charged offense was committed by the
defendant, the matter will be set for trial.' 9 If no probable cause is
found to exist, the court will dismiss the complaint and discharge the
defendant. 20 A complaint may be refiled within 15 days of a dismissal;
however, a second dismissal for the same offense is a bar to any further
prosecution. 2'
11. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §991 with In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 747, 543 P.2d 607,
614, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239, 247 (1975). See generally Cormdnent, Criminal Law-Equal Protection
Requires that Defendants Indicted by a Grand Jury Be Granted a Post-Indictment Preliminary Hear-
ing, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1119 (1979).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE §991(a).
13. See id. §991(b). See generally In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 750, 543 P.2d 607, 616, 126
Cal. Rptr. 239, 248 (1975); 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 455,
456 (1978).
14. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2003 (definition of affidavit).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §991(C).
16. See Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 5 Cal. 3d 98, 106, 485 P.2d 1132, 1136-37, 95
Cal. Rptr. 516, 520-21 (1971). See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Allegations on
Information and Belief§§286, 287 (2nd ed. 1971); CONTINUING EDUCATION OF TE BAR, CALI-
FORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §7.4 (1977).
17. See In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 751, 543 P.2d 607, 616, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248-49
(1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §991(C).
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §991(C).
19. See id. §991(d).
20. See id.
21. See Id. §991(e). See generally People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 664, 511 P.2d 609, 610,
108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 658 (1973).
Criminal Procedure; dismissals
Penal Code §871.5 (new); §§859b, 861, 871, 1238, 1384, 1385, 1387
(amended).
AB 2383 (McVittie); STATS 1980, Ch 938
Pacfic Law Journal Vol 12
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Existing law provides that a court is required to dismiss a criminal
action in certain circumstances' and may on its own motion dismiss a
case in the furtherance of justice.2 In People v. Peters,3 however, the
California Supreme Court held that the term "court" for purposes of
these dismissals did not include a magistrate.' Chapter 938 modifies
the law to allow a judge or magistrate to make a dismissal that serves as
an effective bar to further prosecution.'
Under existing law, if it appears that no public offense has been com-
mitted or that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant is
guilty of a public offense, the magistrate must discharge the defendant.'
The magistrate could not under prior law, however, dismiss the com-
plaint.' Chapter 938 requires the magistrate, in this situation, to dis-
charge the defendant and dismiss the complaint.8 A dismissal by the
judge or magistrate9 for (1) failure to provide a speedy and continu-
ous preliminary examination,1" (2) lack of proof that a public offense
has been committed," or (3) other reasons in furtherance of justice,' 2
always acts as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense when
the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor alone;' 3 but, if the de-
fendant is charged with a felony, or charged with a misdemeanor and a
felony,'4 an order terminating the action serves as a bar to further pros-
ecution only if the order is dismissing the action for the second time.'
In this latter situation, however, a dismissal does not bar further prose-
cution if, subsequent to the dismissal, the judge or magistrate finds sub-
stantial new evidence that the prosecution would not have found with
due diligence prior to the dismissal. 6
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§859b (dismissal for failure to provide a speedy preliminary
examination), 861 (dismissal for failure to provide a continuous preliminary examination), 871
(dismissal due to lack of sufficient cause to believe a public offense has been committed), 1387
(multiple dismissals).
2. See id. §1385.
3. 21 Cal. 3d 749, 581 P.2d 651, 147 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1978).
4. See id. at 753, 581 P.2d at 653, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1385, 1387.
6. See id. §871.
7. See CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 29, §163, at 230 (CAL. PENAL CODE §871 derived from CAL.
STATS. 1851, enacted 1872).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §871.
9. Compare id. §1387 with CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1069, §1, at 2615 (amending CAL. PENAL
CODE §1387).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§859b, 861.
11. Seeid. §871.
12. See id. §1385.
13. See id. §1387.
14. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1069, §1, at 2615.
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1387.
16. See id.
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Currently, both the people and the defendant have the right to a
speedy preliminary examination unless both waive that right or good
cause for a continuance is found.17 Moreover, the preliminary exami-
nation must occur within ten court days of the arraignment or plea,
whichever is later, or the complaint must be dismissed.' 8 Prior to
Chapter 938, however, the preliminary examination could not be post-
poned beyond ten court days when the defendant was in custody unless
the defendant personally waived the ten-day limit. 19 Chapter 938, in
addition to allowing the defendant to personally waive the ten-court
day limit,20 permits a postponement beyond ten court days if theprose-
cution establishes good cause for the postponement.21 The Chapter
provides, however, that the preliminary examination must be com-
menced within 60 days of the arraignment or plea unless the defendant
personally waives the 60-day time limit.22
Existing law also requires that the preliminary examination be com-
pleted in one continuous session unless the magistrate postpones the
examination for good cause shown by affidavit.23 Prior to Chapter 938,
however, the postponement could not exceed two days at a time or six
days in all unless the defendant moved for, or consented to, a longer
delay.24 With the enactment of Chapter 938, continuation of the pre-
liminary examination must not be postponed beyond ten court days
unless the defendantpersonally waives the right to a continuous exami-
nation 25 or the prosecution establishes good cause for a postpone-
ment.26 The preliminary examination must not be postponed beyond
60 days from the date the motion to postpone the examination is
granted unless by consent or on motion of the defendant.2 7 In either a
postponement or a continuance of a preliminary examination, a de-
fendant must be released on his or her own recognizance unless
charged with a capital offense when the proof is evident and the pre-
sumption great.28
17. See id. §§859b, 1050.
18. See id. §859b.
19. See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 1152, §1, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §859b).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §859b(a).
21. See id. §859b(b).
22. See id. §859b.
23. See id. §861.
24. See CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 29, §149, at 228 (CAL. PENAL CODE §861 derived from CAL.
STATS. 1851 and enacted 1872).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE §861(a).
26. See id. §861(b).
27. See id. §861.
28. See id. §§859b(b), 861(b), 1318.
Pacific Law Journal Vol 12
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Chapter 938 also provides for an appeal of a dismissal in the event
that the action is terminated by the magistrate for (1) failure to pro-
vide a speedy or continuous preliminary examination,29 (2) lack of
proof that a public offense has been committed,3 ° or (3) other reasons
in the furtherance of justice.3' The prosecution may make a motion in
the superior court seeking reinstatement of the complaint or a portion
thereof, as well as reinstatement of the custodial status of the defendant
under the same terms and conditions as when the defendant last ap-
peared before the magistrate, if the prosecution believes that, as a mat-
ter of law, the magistrate erroneously dismissed the action.32 This
motion must be made within ten days after the dismissal and notice
must be given to the defendant and the magistrate.33 The superior
court must hear and determine the motion on the basis of the proceed-
ings that occurred before the magistrate.3 4 Although the prosecution
may appeal the denial of the reinstatement35 if the court determines
that the dismissal was proper, the prosecution is barred from refiling
the dismissed action, or a portion thereof.36 If the complaint is rein-
stated by the superior court, the magistrate must resume the proceed-
ings within ten days after either the order directing reinstatement has
been entered or the remittur has been fled in the superior court.37 In
addition, the defendant may seek review of the decision to reinstate the
complaint on the ground that the defendant has been committed with-
out sufficient cause to believe a public offense has been committed.38
In summary, Chapter 938 will allow a magistrate to make a dismissal
which serves as an effective bar to further prosecution. 39 This appar-
ently eliminates the problems created by the narrow interpretation of
the term "court" by the California Supreme Court in People v. Peters.4°
29. See id. §§859b, 861, 871.5.
30. Seeid. §§871, 871.5.
31. See id. §§871.5, 1385.
32. See id. §871.5.
33. See id.
34. See Id.
35. See id. §§871.5, 1238(a)(9).
36. See id. §871.5.
37. See id.
38. See Id. §§871, 871.5, 995, 999a.
39. See id. §§859b, 861, 871, 1387.
40. Compare id with People v. Peters, 21 Cal. 3d 749, 753, 581 P.2d 651, 653, 147 Cal. Rptr.
646, 648 (1978).
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Criminal Procedure; court-appointed counsel
Government Code §27707 (amended); Penal Code §987 (amended).
AB 1934 (McVittie); STATS 1980, Ch 1021
Support: California Peace Officers Association; County Supervisors
Association; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Under existing law, if the defendant in a criminal case appears for an
arraignment or other criminal proceeding' without counsel, the court is
required to inform the defendant of his or her right to counsel and to
appoint a defense attorney if defendant desires and cannot afford one.2
To assist the court in determining if a defendant is financially able to
employ counsel,3 the public defender or the court may require a de-
fendant to file a confidential and privileged4 financial statement under
penalty of perjury. 5 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1021, there were
no similar filing requirements to aid the court in ascertaining a defend-
ant's financial status pursuant to the court's descretionary appointment
of counsel other than the public defender.6 Chapter 1021 specifies that,
before appointing any counsel, the court may now require a defendant
to file a confidential and privileged financial statement for purposes of
determining the defendant's financial need.7 In addition, a financial
statement filed pursuant to appointment of a public defender or private
counsel is not available to the prosecution except for investigation of
possible perjury based on false material in the statement, and then only
after the conclusion of the proceedings for which the financial state-
ment was submitted.'
1. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§27706, 27707.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §987. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). Seegener.
ally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, §14.
3. See In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 619-20, 427 P.2d 179, 187-88, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587-88
(1967); Still v. Justice Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 815, 818, 97 Cal. Rptr. 213, 214-15 (1971).
4. See People v. Canfield, 12 Cal. 3d 699, 704, 527 P.2d 633, 636, 117 Cal. Rptr. 81, 84
(1974).
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §27707; CAL. PENAL CODE §987(c).
6. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §987 with CAL. GOV'T CODE §27707 and CAL. STATS. 1971,
c. 1800, §5, at 3898 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §987). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §987.2.
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §987(c).
8. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §27707; CAL. PENAL CODE §§987(c), 987.8.
Criminal Procedure; disqualification of prosecutor
Penal Code §1424 (new).
SB 1520 (Nejedly); STATS 1980, Ch 780
Pactfic Law Journal Vol 12
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Support: California District Attorneys Association; Office of the
Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Under existing case law, a trial judge is permitted to disqualify the
district attorney prosecuting a criminal trial when a conflict of interest
exists that prejudices, or appears to prejudice, the attorney against the
accused.' Incorporating this idea, Chapter 780 states that the trial
court, upon a motion to disqualify, may not disqualify the district attor-
ney unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that
would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.'
Notice of any motion to disqualify a district attorney from prosecuting
a criminal case must be served on the district attorney and the Attorney
General at least ten days before the motion is heard and must state the
relevant facts and the legal authorities supporting a motion.3 In addi-
tion, the Attorney General may appear at the hearing and file a written
opinion with the court on the motion to disqualify.4 Moreover, either
the district attorney or the Attorney General may appeal an order dis-
qualifying the district attorney and the order will be stayed while any
appeal is pending.'
1. See People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 269, 561 P.2d 1164, 1173, 137 Cal. Rptr.
476, 485 (1977).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1424.
3. See id.
4. See id; e 19 Cal. 3d at 270, 561 P.2d at 1174, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1977) (trial court
may order Attorney General to appear and state whether the state will prosecute a criminal case
after disqualification of the district attorney).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1424.
Criminal Procedure; polygraph examinations
Penal Code §637.4 (new).
SB 1440 (Wilson); STATS 1980, Ch 880
Support: National Organization of Women; Office of the Governor,
Legal Affairs Unit
Chapter 880 prohibits any state or local agency, or any employee
thereof, from requiring or requesting a complaining witness in any case
involving the use of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great
bodily harm in the commission of any sex offense to submit to a poly-
Selected 1980 California Legislation
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graph examination as a precondition to filing an accusatory pleading.'
This enactment is an apparent response to the routine misuse of the
polygraph examination by some police departments that require the in-
nocent victims of sexual assaults to undergo these examinations prior to
filing a report of the crime, thereby tending to discourage the reporting
of sex crimes.2 In addition, Chapter 880 allows any person who is in-
jured by a violation of this provision to bring an action against the
violator for damages in the amount of $1000 or for actual damages,
whichever is greater.'
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §637.4(a).
2. See generally Senator Bob Wilson, Press Release, August 22, 1980.
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §637.4(b).
Criminal Procedure; psychiatric examination of sexual assault
victims
Penal Code §1112 (new).
SB 500 (Watson); STATS 1980, Ch 16
Support: Attorney General of California; National Organization for
Women; Women in Politics
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice; California Trial Lawyers Association; Office of
the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 16, the California Supreme Court
sanctioned court-ordered psychiatric examinations of victims in sexual
assault cases.' The court recognized a need for these examinations be-
cause of the evidentiary problems in a rape prosecution when there is
no testimony corroborating the victim's account of the assault.2 Chap-
ter 16 now prohibits a trial court from ordering a psychiatric or psycho-
logical examination3 of any prosecuting witness,4 complaining witness,-*
1. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176-77, 410 P.2d 838, 849, 49 Cal. Rptr.
302, 313 (1966); CAL. PENAL CODE §220. See generally 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §924A
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested
Approach, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 648 (1960); O'Neale, Court Ordered Examination in a CriminalProse-
cution-Or How Many Times Must a Woman be Raped, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 119 (1978);
Comment, Ballard Motion" Relic of the Past or Trend of the Future, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 189
(1979); Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324
(1959).
2. See 64 Cal. 2d at 176-77, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
3. See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §§1064
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 12
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or any other witness, or of the victim in a sexual assault prosecution for
the purpose of assessing his or her credibility.' Through removal of the
psychological examination procedure, which was previously limited to
sexual assault prosecutions,7 the legislature is apparently attempting to
treat sexual assault victims in the same manner as victims of other
crimes.8
(psychiatric examination of witness), 1226A (psychiatric impeachment) (2nd ed. 1966), (Supp.
1977).
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of prosecuting witness).
5. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (definition of complaining witness).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1112. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE §780; B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §§1208, 1211, 1223 (attack on credibility
of witness) (2nd ed. 1966).
7. See People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 137, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 283-84 (1976); Peo-
ple v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974).
8. See Comment, The Rape Victinv A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J.
36, 51 (1974).
Criminal Procedure; evidentiary privilege, training for sexual
assault investigations
Evidence Code §§1035, 1035.2, 1035.4, 1035.6, 1035.8, 1036, 1036.2
(new); §912 (amended); Health and Safety Code §1598.1 (amended);
Penal Code §§13516, 13836, 13836.1, 13836.2, 13837 (new).
SB 862 (Robbins); STATS 1980, Ch 917
Support: Department of Health Services; National Organization of
Women; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Opposition: Board of Medical Quality Assurance; California Attor-
neys for Criminal Justice
California statutory provisions provide an evidentiary privilege for
confidential communications between lawyer and client,' husband and
wife,2 physician and patient,3 clergyman and penitent,4 and psycho-
therapist and patient.5 Chapter 917 creates an additional privilege for
the sexual assault counselor-victim relationship. In addition, Chapter
917 provides for the implementation of sexual assault investigation
1. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§950-962.
2. See id. §§970-987.
3. See id. §§990-1007.
4. See id. §§1030-1034.
5. See id. §§1010-1028.
6. Compare id. §912 with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 299, §2, at 1323 (enacting CAL. EViD. CODE
§912). See geneally CAL. EVID. CODE §§1035-1036.2.
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training.7
The sexual assault counselor-victim privilege created by Chapter 917
is subject to existing provisions of the Evidence Code regarding waiver
of the privilege and protected disclosures.8 The privilege applies only
to confidential communications9 which include any information trans-
mitted between the victim'" and the sexual assault counselor" in the
course of their relationship by a means which, so far as the victim is
aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those
persons necessary to further the interests of the victim.'2 The term in-
cludes all information and opinions regarding the victim's sexual con-
duct or reputation in sexual matters.' 3 The term, however, does not
include advice given by the counselor on potential testimony in court
or information received by the counselor which constitutes relevant evi-
dence of the alleged sexual assault'4 which is the subject of a criminal
proceeding.'-
The counselor must claim the privilege whenever he or she is present
when the confidential communication is sought to be disclosed and
when authorized to claim it.' 6 The counselor, however, cannot claim
the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if
otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure."7 The
victim has the privilege of refusing to disclose, and of preventing an-
other from .disclosing, a confidential communication between the vic-
tim and his or her counselor if the privilege is claimed by (1) the
holder of the privilege, 8 (2) any person authorized by the holder of
the privilege to claim that privilege,' 9 or (3) the person who was the
counselor at the time of the confidential communication.20 The vic-
tim's guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of the vic-
tim if the victim is dead, may also be a holder of the privilege.2 '
7. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§13516(c), 13836.
8. See CAL. EVID. CODE §912.
9. See id. §§1035.4, 1035.8.
10. See id. §1035 (definition of victim).
11. See id. §1035.2 (definition of, and qualifications to become, sexual assault victim coun-
selor).
12. See id. §1035.4.
13. Id.
14. See id. § 1036 (definition of sexual assault).
15. Id.
16. Id. §§1035.8(c), 1036.
17. Id. §1035.8(c).
18. See id. §1035.8(a).
19. See id. §1035.8(b).
20. See id. §1035.8(c).
21. See id. §1035.6(b), (c).
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Additionally, Chapter 917 outlines a procedure to be followed in the
event of a dispute regarding what qualifies as a confidential communi-
cation.2 2 The defendant may make a written motion to the court stat-
ing that he or she can offer proof of the relevancy of evidence of prior
inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeachment, or proof of
evidence regarding lack of any element of the offense charged.2 3 The
motion must be accompanied by an affidavit in which the offer of proof
is stated. 4 Upon a finding that the offer is sufficient, the court must
order a hearing out of the presence of the jury, if any, to allow ques-
tioning of the counselor.25 If the court finds that any evidence offered
by the defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the victim is rele-
vant, 6 and does not exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence,27
the court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced
by the defendant and the nature of the questions to be permitted. 8
The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the
court. 2 9
Finally, Chapter 917 also provides for the following: (1) the estab-
lishment of an advisory committee to determine the standards and
services which rape crisis centers must maintain to receive state funding
and to develop a course of training for district attorneys regarding the
investigation and prosecution of sexual assault cases; 0 and (2) the re-
quirement that all officers assigned as sexual assault investigations spe-
cialists successfully complete a training program within six months of
assignment.3 1
In summary, Chapter 917 creates an evidentiary privilege for the sex-
ual assault counselor-victim relationship.32 It also increases training
for sexual assault investigations33 in an attempt to implement the legis-
lature's expressly declared intent of encouraging the establishment of
sex crime investigation units in police agencies and in district attorneys'
offices throughout the state.3 4
22. See id. §1035.4.
23. See id. §1035.4(1).
24. See id. §1035.4(2).
25. See id. §1035.4(3).
26. See id. §1035.4(4). See also id. §780.
27. See Id. §1035.4(4). See also id. §352.
28. Id. §1035.4(4).
29. Id.
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE §13836 (course will include training in the unique emotional
trauma experienced by victims of sexual assaults). See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§1598.1; CAL. PENAL CODE §13837.
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE §13516 (course must include police response to, and treatment of,
victims of sexual assault).
32. See CAL. EvID. CODE §912. See generally id. §§1035-1036.2.
33. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§13516, 13836.
34. See id. §§13516(d), 13836.
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COMMENT
The evidentiary privilege created by Chapter 917 extends only to
confidential communications between the sexual assault counselor and
the victim.3 5 Chapter 917, however, specifically excludes from the defi-
nition of confidential communication any information received by the
sexual assault counselor which constitutes relevant evidence of the facts
and circumstances involving an alleged sexual assault.36 Chapter 917
also allows the defendant to make a motion for purposes of impeach-
ment or to prove that any element of an offense charged is not pres-
ent.37 If the evidence offered is deemed relevant,38 the privilege may
not be invoked. 39 Moreover, when the offer of proof relates to the sex-
ual conduct of the victim, Chapter 917 provides that the offer must be
both relevant and admissible; however, there is no further express limi-
tation on the offer if it is for the purpose of showing lack of an element
of the offense due to the consent of the victim.4" Section 1103 of the
Evidence Code provides that evidence of specific instances of the wit-
ness' sexual conduct may not be admissible by the defendant in order
to prove consent by the complaining witness.41 Viewed in conjunction
with the specific reference to Sections 780 and 352 of the Evidence
Code,42 the failure of Chapter 917 to specify compliance with Section
1103 raises the possibility that any evidence of sexual conduct intro-
duced under Chapter 917 is admissible so long as it satisfies the general
requirements of admissibility and relevancy.43
35. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§1035.4, 1035.8.
36. See id. §1035.4.
37. See id. §1035.4(1).
38. See Id. §210 (definition of relevant evidence).
39. See id. §1035.4.
40. See id. §1035.4(4). See also id. §§352, 780, 782, 1103(2).
41. See id. §1103(2).
42. See id. §1035.4(4).
43. See id. §1035.4(1), (4).
Criminal Procedure; disclosure of medical records
Penal Code Chapter 3.5 (commencing with §1542) (new); Welfare
and Institutions Code §5328.01 (new).
SB 410 (Roberti); STATS 1980, Ch 1061
Support: Attorney General of California; California District Attor-
neys Association; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
(Effective September 25, 1980)
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SIB 1975 (Keene); STATS 1980, Ch 1080
Support: Department of Industrial Relations; Office of the Gover-
nor, Legal Affairs Unit
Existing law requires a special master' to be appointed before the
records held by a physician2 or a psychotherapist 3 are disclosed to a
magistrate.4 In addition, records held by state medical facilities5 can-
not be disseminated to governmental law enforcement agencies unless
the information is needed to protect federal and state elective constitu-
tional officers and their families.6 Chapter 1061 now permits a law en-
forcement agency, in some circumstances, to examine records in the
possession or control of a state medical facility relating to a patient who
has been confined (1) as a mentally disordered sex offender,7 (2) as
not guilty by reason of insanity,s or (3) pending a determination of
the patient's competence to stand trial9 (hereinafter referred to as
records of criminal patients). Chapter 1080 provides procedures for
disclosure to law enforcement agencies' ° of records held by health care
facilities I regarding any patient when the records are not privileged
records required to be secured by the special master procedure 12 or re-
quired by law to be confidential. 3
To obtain records held by a health care facility or a state medical
facility, a law enforcement agency must have the prior written consent
of the patient, " or a court order based upon a showing of good cause
and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1524(d) (definition of special master).
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE §990 (definition of physician).
3. See id. § 1010 (definition of psychotherapist).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1523, 1524(c)-(f). See generally 11 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SE-
LECTED 1979 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 440 (1980).
5. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§1502 (definition of community care facility), 1250 (definition of health facility); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§4100, 4401, 4440 (definition of state mental hospitals), 7100 (definition of county
mental hospital).
6. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328(g).
7. See Id. §5328.01. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §2900) (definition of mentally disor-
dered sex offender).
S. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1026 (in-
sanity plea).
9. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1368 (mental
competence).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1545(b) (law enforcement agency defined as the Attorney Gen-
eral, every district attorney, and every state agency expressly authorized by statute to investigate
or prosecute law violators).
11. See id. §1545(a) (health care facility defined as any licensed clinic, health dispensary,
health facility, mental hospital, drug abuse clinic, or detoxification center).
12. See generally id. §1524.
13. Seeid. §1543(a). See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11879 (disclosure of identity
of methadone treatment patients), 11977 (disclosure of identity of narcotic or drug abuse patients).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(a)(1); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(a).
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records are located.'I In assessing good cause for the order, the court
must: (1) weigh the public interest and the need for disclosure against
the injury to the patient, the physician-patient relationship, and the
treatment services;' 6 and (2) find a reasonable likelihood that the
records will disclose material information or evidence of substantial
value in connection with the prosecution or investigation.17 Addition-
ally, a court may issue a search warrant for general medical records
held by a health care facility.' However, before a law enforcement
agency may obtain records from a state medical facility pertaining to a
criminal patient, a court of competent jurisdiction must determine that
the crime involves the causing of, or direct threatening of, the loss of
life or serious bodily injury. 9 When granting or denying a subpoena
giving the records to the agency, the court must state on the record the
reasons for the decision and the facts that the court considered in mak-
ing the decision.2" Further, the law enforcement agency specifically
must describe the records being sought.2'
A law enforcement agency requesting access to general medical
records must give the health care facility notice of the application for
disclosure and afford the health care facility an opportunity to appear
and be heard. 2 This notice may be delayed for 30 days if the law en-
forcement agency obtains an extraordinary order.2" A law enforcement
agency applying for disclosure of a criminal patient's records may ob-
tain an extraordinary order to compel the state medical facility to pro-
duce the records immediately.2 4 In both cases the court will grant an
extraordinary order upon a showing of good cause to believe that the
investigation would be seriously impeded by failure to obtain immedi-
ate disclosure of the records.2 " A law enforcement agency that has re-
quested records pertaining to a criminal patient may obtain copies only
of the original records if the patient is currently receiving treatment at
the state medical facility. 6 Once the investigation or prosecution is
complete, the law enforcement agency must return the records, and any
copies made, to the state medical facility except for those portions
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(a)(2); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(b).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(a)(2)(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(b)(1).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(a)(2)(B); CAL. vELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(b)(2).
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(a)(3). See generall id. §1524; B. WITMIN, CALIFORNIA
EViDENCE, Exclusion oflllegal, Obtained Evidence §§121-143 (2d ed. 1966), (Supp. 1977).
19. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(b)(3).
20. See id. §5328.01(b)(4).
21. See id. §5328.01(b).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(c).
23. See id. §§1543(c), 1544.
24. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(c).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1543(c), 1544; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(c).
26. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(e).
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made a part of the court record." Further, Chapters 1061 and 1080
require the court to make sure that the information obtained from the
records is not disclosed unnecessarily or disseminated,"8 thereby assur-
ing that the patient's right of privacy is protected. 9 Willful dissemina-
tion of information contained in records of a criminal patient held by a
state medical facility is a misdemeanor unless the dissemination relates
to the criminal investigation for which the records were obtained;30
however, no similar criminal violation is provided for under the terms
of Chapter 1080 that control access to general medical records.31
Moreover, Chapter 1080 does not apply to investigations of Medi-Cal
benefits fraud, to investigations of insurance fraud performed by the
Department of Insurance or by the California Highway Patrol, or to
investigations or research regarding health and safety performed by, or
under agreement with, the Department of Industrial Relations. 32 Dis-
closure by a medical facility or medical provider of information con-
tained in medical records also is not prohibited when disclosure is
mandated by statute or regulation. 3 The provisions of Chapter 1061
that control access to records of a criminal patient will be repealed on
January 1, 1983, unless a later statute deletes or extends the date. 4
27. See id. §5328.01(b)(6).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543(d); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(b)(5).
29. See generalo Division of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669,
156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979).
30. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01(d).
31. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1543.
32. See id. §1543(d).
33. See id. §1543(e).
34. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.01.
Criminal Procedure; driving violations-prior convictions
Vehicle Code §23102.4 (new).
AB 1935 (McVittie); STATS 1980, Ch 468
Support: Department of Finance; Office of the Governor, Legal Af-
fairs Unit
Opposition: Department of Motor Vehicles
Existing law provides for the enhancement of a sentence for convic-
tion of driving under the influence of liquor or drugs, or driving with a
revoked or suspended license, when the defendant is charged with a
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previous conviction of the same offense.' A defendant may always
challenge the previous conviction on constitutional grounds precedent
to its use for enhancement purposes2 and, under prior law, the constitu-
tionality of the previous conviction was subject to relitigation in al/
subsequent prosecution for driving under the influence of liquor or
drugs.3
Chapter 468 revises the law to provide that when a hearing on the
constitutionality of a prior conviction has been held, a judicial determi-
nation that the conviction is constitutional bars a constitutional attack
in a later prosecution in which the same prior conviction is charged.4
Chapter 468 does not preclude this challenge, however, if at a later time
a subsequent statute or appellate court decision having retroactive ap-
plication affords a new ground for constitutional challenge.5 Moreover,
a determination that a prior conviction is unconstitutional precludes
the allegation or use of the prior conviction in any judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding, and the Department of Motor Vehicles must strike
the prior conviction from its records.6
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§14601(b), (c), 23102(d), (e), (f), (g).
2. See Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 3 Cal. 3d 335, 338-39, 475 P.2d 858, 859-
61, 90 Cal. Rptr. 586, 587-89 (1970); People v. Coffey. 67 Cal. 2d 204, 214-15, 430 P.2d 15, 22, 60
Cal. Rptr. 457, 464 (1967); In re Rogers, 102 Cal. App. 3d 61, 66, 162 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232 (1980);
CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.2. Cf. In re Streeter, 66 Cal. 2d 47, 50-51, 423 P.2d 976, 977-78, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 824, 826 (1967) (concerning reference to prior convictions in term-fixing or parole); People v.
Cota, 98 Cal. App. 3d 211, 215-16, 159 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403-04 (1979) (relating to possession of
concealable firearms).
3. See People v. Allheim, 48 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6, 121 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (1975); CAL.
VEH. CODE §23102.2(b)(5). See also Gonzalez v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 706, 711-12,
108 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1973).
4. See CAL. VEH. CODE §23102.4.
5. See id.
6. See id.
Criminal Procedure; continuance after surprise alibi
Penal Code §1051 (new).
AB 3199 (Fenton); STATS 1980, Ch 551
Support: Attorney General of California; Office of the Governor,
Legal Affairs Unit
Existing law provides that a continuance in a criminal trial will be
granted only upon a showing of good cause.' The granting of a contin-
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1050.
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uance is within the discretion of the trial judge2 and, apart from a nar-
row exception for mandatory continuances, 3 there are no statutory
grounds for a continuance.4 With the enactment of Chapter 551, there
is good cause for a reasonable continuance in a criminal trial if a wit-
ness other than the defendant testifies regarding an alibi defense, unless
the court finds that the prosecutor was, or with due diligence should
have been, aware of this evidence.' Chapter 551, by affording the pros-
ecution in a criminal trial the statutory right to a continuance if con-
fronted with a surprise alibi defense,6 apparently provides a statutory
codification of existing trial procedure.7
2. See People v. Farley, 267 Cal. App. 2d 214, 221, 72 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (1968); People v.
Manson, 183 Cal. App. 2d 168, 173, 6 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1960).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1050. See generall B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE, Trial §286 (1963) (grounds for continuance).
4. See B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §278 (1963), (Supp. 1978)
(grounds for continuance).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1051.
6. Compare id. §1050 with id. §1051.
7. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1970); See generally Reynolds v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 839-40, 528 P.2d 45, 48, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 440 (1974); Fedeli, Jr., TheAlibi
Witness Rule: Sewing Up the "Hi' Pocket" Defense, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 155, 159 (1970-
71); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 247-48 (1964).
Criminal Procedure; prison terms
Business and Professions Code §7522 (amended); Health and Safety
Code §§8325, 12401 (amended); Penal Code §§243.2, 243.4, 245.2,
245.4, 830.10, 830.11, 830.31, 830.35, 830.36, 830.5a, 830.7 (repealed);
830.10, 830.31, 830.7, 830.8 (new); 241, 243, 245, 273.5, 273a, 273d,
830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 831, 832.4, 1026.5, 1170,
1170.1, 1203.01, 1203.2a, 2900, 3041.5, 3042, 3421, 4011.7, 4016.5,
4131.5, 4133, 4852.03, 4852.16, 5002, 5055, 12027, 12031, 12420,
13012 (amended); Vehicle Code §§165.3, 165.4, 22657.5, 22659 (re-
pealed); 165, 1808.4, 2416, 22651, 22653, 22654, 22655, 22656, 22702
(amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §5328.02 (new); §§240,
1721, 1802, 5008 (amended).
SB 1877 (Presley); STATS 1980, Ch 1117
Support: Department of Finance; Department of the Youth Author-
ity; Office of the Governor
SB 1447 (Presley); STATS 1980, Ch 1340
(Effective September 30, 1980)
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Support: Department of Finance; Commission on Police Officer
Standards and Training; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Chapter 1117 establishes new procedures for determining the period
of rehabilitation that a convicted felon must serve prior to receiving a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.I Moreover, Chapter 1117 pro-
vides for determinate sentencing for certain crimes that previously were
punished by indeterminate prison terms, 2 and additionally designates
the jurisdiction where the terms of imprisonment will be served when a
person committed to the Director of Corrections (hereinafter referred
to as the Director) is subsequently committed to a penal or correctional
institution in another jurisdiction.' Further, Chapter 1117 clarifies the
parole procedures practiced by both the Youthful Offender Parole
Board and the Board of Prison Terms.4
Period of Rehabilitation
Currently, any person convicted of a felony5 who has been released
after completion of his or her prison term or who is on parole, may
petition the superior court for a certificate of rehabilitation pardon.'
To receive this certificate, the petitioner must serve a period of rehabili-
tation7 that includes a mandatory three-year state residency require-
ment.8 Under prior law, in addition to the mandatory three-year
residency requirement, the period of rehabilitation was determined by
adding 30 days for every year of the mandated statutory prison term
and a proportional number of days for every part of a year prescribed
by statute.9 With the enactment of Chapter 1117, the additional period
of rehabilitation determined with reference to the 30-day formula has
been deleted.' 0 Instead, Chapter 1117 provides that the period of reha-
bilitation will be the mandatory three-year residency requirement plus
fouryears for persons convicted of the following crimes:" (1) mur-
1. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03.
2. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §12401; CAL. PENAL CODE §§273.5, 273a,
273d, 4011.7, 4131.5, 4133, 12420.
3. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §2900.
4. See generally id. §§3041.5, 3042, 5002(e); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1721, 1802.
5. But see CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.01(d).
6. See id. §4852.01. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crime
§1112(a) (1963).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§4852.06, 4852.13. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crime §1 12(a) (1963).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03.
9. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 434, §3, at 1111 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03). See
generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crime §1112(b) (1963).
10. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03 with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 434, §3, at 1111.
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03(l).
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der; 2 (2) kidnapping;' 3 (3) wrecking or derailing a train;14 (4) as-
sault by a life prisoner with a means of force likely to cause great
bodily harm;' 5 (5) unlawful explosion of a destructive device causing
death, mayhem, or great bodily injury;' 6 (6) sabotage of articles or
preparations for war or defense; ' 7 or (7) any other offense that carries
a life sentence.' Moreover, for any person who committed an offense
that is not included in this list, the period of rehabilitation is now two
years in addition to the mandatory three years of residency.' 9
Existing law provides that a term of imprisonment starts running on
the actual delivery of the defendant into the custody of the Director at
the place designated by the Director for the reception of convicted
felons.2" Chapter 1117 provides a further qualification to existing law
by requiring that the place of reception be an institution under the ju-
risdiction of the Director.2'
Term of Imprisonment and Determinate Sentencing
When a person committed to the Director is subsequently committed
to a penal or correctional institution in another jurisdiction, Chapter
1117 provides that the Director must designate the institution in the
other jurisdiction as the place for reception and service of the Califor-
nia term if (1) the subsequent commitment is ordered to be served
concurrently with the California commitment, (2) the prisoner is
placed in a penal or correctional institution of the other jurisdiction,
and (3) the prisoner is not received by the Director.22 Moreover,
while under existing law time served in an institution designated by the
Director will be credited as service of the term of imprisonment,23
Chapter 1117 states that any time during which the prisoner is deemed
an escapee will not be credited as service of the prison term.24
In addition to provisions concerning the term of imprisonment,
Chapter 1117 provides for determinate prison sentencing for certain
crimes not originally covered by the Uniform Determinate Sentencing
12. See id. §187.
13. See id. §209.
14. See id. §219.
15. See id. §4500.
16. See id. §12310.
17. See MIL. & VET. Code §1672.
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.03(l).
19. See id. §4852.03(2).
20. See id. §2900(a).
21. Compare id. §2900 with CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1856, §1, at 3832.
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE §2900(b)(3).
23. See Id. §2900(c).
24. See id. §2900(a), (c)(2).
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Act.25 Specifically, the following crimes now carry a determinate
prison term of 16 months or two or three years:26 (1) escape from a
hospital by force or violence by a person arrested for, charged with, or
convicted of a misdemeanor; 7 (2) battery by a confinee of one insti-
tution upon a person not confined in that institution;2" (3) escape or
attempted escape from an industrial farm;29 (4) sale, possession, or
transportation of tear gas;30 and (5) the knowing, unlawful possession
of an explosive.31 In addition, persons found guilty of spouse beating,
2
willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a child,33 or willful inflic-
tion of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury upon a child34
will receive a sentence of two, three, or four years.35 Chapter 1117 fur-
ther allows the trial court, prior to sentencing a person, to request infor-
mation from the Board of Prison Terms concerning the sentences of
other persons convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances
in California.36
Furthermore, Chapter 1346 changes the penalty imposed for battery
against a peace officer 37 or fire fighter.38 Under prior law, when a bat-
tery39 was committed against a peace officer or fire fighter and the per-
son committing the offense knew, or reasonably should have known,
that the officer or fire fighter was engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, the crime was punishable by up to a year in the county jail,
or by 16 months or two or three years in the state prison.40 Chapter
1346 changes the punishment for such a battery to a fine of no more
than $1000, up to a year in the county jail, or both.4' Chapter 1346
further provides that if the peace officer or fire fighter sustains any in-
25. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §12401; CAL. PENAL CODE §§273.5, 273a, 273d,
4011.7, 4131.5, 4133, 12420. See generally CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, at 5061 (enacting the Uni-
form Determinate Sentencing Act); 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLA-
TION 282 (1977).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE §18. Compare id with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §12401 and
CAL. PENAL CODE §§4011.7, 4131.5, 4133, 12420.
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE §4011.7.
28. Seeid. §4131.5.
29. See id. §4133.
30. See id. §12420.
31. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§12305, 12401.
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE §273.5.
33. See id. §273a.
34. See id. §273d.
35. See id. §§273.5, 273a, 273d.
36. Seeid. §1170(g).
37. See id. §§830-832.7 (definition of peace officer).
38. See Id. §245.1 (definition of fireman); MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 855
(3d ed.) (definition of fireman, fire fighter). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §243.
39. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRI M ES, Crimes Against the Person §§255, 258,
259, 278 (1963), (Supp. 1975), (Supp. 1978), §277A (Supp. 1978).
40. See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §150.5, at 5105 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §243).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE §243.
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jury during the commission of the battery, the punishment is to be a
fine of up to $1000, or imprisonment for up to a year in the county jail,
or imprisonment for 16 months or two or three years in the state
prison a.4  Chapter 1346 defines "injury" as any physical injury that re-
quires professional medical treatment.43
Chapter 1117 makes a further change in the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act.44 Under the Act, any person convicted of two or more
felony offenses may not receive a term of imprisonment that exceeds
double the middle term of the offense providing the most severe pun-
ishment, although some exceptions are provided. 5 With the enactment
of Chapter 1117, a defendant who is convicted of felony escape from an
institution in which he or she is lawfully confined is also excepted from
this sentencing provision and therefore may be sentenced to more than
double the period of the base term. 6
Youthful Offender Parole Board and Board of Prison Terms
Chapter 1117 reduces from five to four the number of members of
the Youthful Offender Parole Board required to be present to exercise
the Board's functions.47 Under existing law, when a youthful offender
is required by law to be discharged, but the Youthful Offender Parole
Board determines that release of that person would be physically dan-
gerous to the public, the Board may apply to the committing court for
an order for the continued detention of the youthful offender. 48 This
order extends the control of the Youth Authority over the youthful of-
fender; however, unless the youthful offender is previously discharged,
Chapter 1117 states that the Youthful Offender Parole Board, in regard
to persons committed after conviction in criminal proceedings, must
file an application for continued detention within two years after the
extension if continued detention is determined to be necessary.4 9 Prior
law provided for a five-year period before an application for continued
detention was required."
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See generally id. §§l 170(b), 1170.1(f). Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, §273,
at 5140.
45. See People v. Wright, 92 Cal. App. 3d 811, 812-13, 154 Cal. Rptr. 926, 926-27 (1979);
People v. Rosalez, 89 Cal. App. 3d 789, 793, 153 Cal. Rptr. 65, 67 (1979). See note 44 supra.
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(f).
47. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §1721(a) with CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 860, §17, at-
See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1716-1726, 1737.1, 1754, 1765, 1766, 1767.5, 1800-
1803.
48. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1769-1771, 1780.
49. See id. §§1800, 1802.
50. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 860, §37, at - (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §1802).
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The Board of Prison Terms, like the Youthful Offender Parole
Board, has authority with respect to parole procedures.-" Under ex-
isting law, when the Board acts to postpone a previously set parole
date, the prisoner affected has a right to a review of the action.5 2 Under
prior law, that review was required to occur within 90 days of notice of
the postponement being received by the prisoner; Chapter 1117 now
deletes the time limitation within which this review must take place.5 3
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1117, specific procedures delineated
when the Board of Prison Terms was to meet to consider the parole
suitability of, or the setting or advancing of a parole date for, any life
prisoner. 4 Chapter 1117 provides that these procedures no longer ap-
ply when the Board is meeting to consider advancing the prisoner's
parole date due to the prisoner's conduct since his or her last hearing."
Further, Chapter 1117 vests all powers and duties of the Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles, and the Advisory Pardon Board, in the
Board of Prison Terms, 56 whereas previously these powers and duties
were vested in the Department of Corrections. 7 Moreover, notwith-
standing the existing law that makes all records obtained from volun-
tary or involuntary patients at a mental health care facility confidential
unless there is a specified exception, 58 Chapter 1117 also provides that
these records will be disclosed, as necessary to the administration of
justice, to the Youth Authority and Adult Correctional Agency, or any
component thereof.5 9
51. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§5075-5082; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§1752-1776.
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3041.5(b)(3).
53. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 255, §20, at -.
54. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 255, §22, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §3042), See gener-
ally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crime § 1096 (1963), (Supp. 1975), (Supp.
1978), §1091E (Supp. 1978).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE §3042(e).
56. See id. §5002(e). See generally id. §§5075-5082.
57. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 255, §44, at - (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §5002). Seegener-
ally CAL. PENAL CODE §§5000-5008, 5011; 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishment for
Crime §898 (1963), (Supp. 1975), (Supp. 1978).
58. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328.
59. See id. §5328.02.
Criminal Procedure; misdemeanors-infractions, reductions
Penal Code §17 (amended, repealed, and reenacted); §19e (new and
repealed).
AB 1813 (Kapiloff); STATS 1980, Ch 1270
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Support: California Highway Patrol; California Judges Association;
Department of Motor Vehicles; Office of the Governor, Legal Affairs
Unit
Opposition: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California
District Attorneys Association
Existing law permits a magistrate to reduce a felony charge to a mis-
demeanor at or before the preliminary examination' or prior to order-
ing a defendant to answer.2 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1270,
however, no comparable provisions existed for reducing misdemeanors
to infractions.3 Chapter 1270 now allows the court or the prosecutor to
reduce certain misdemeanor charges4 to infractions.5
Specifically, the prosecutor may file a complaint charging the de-
fendant with an infraction unless the defendant, after being informed
of his or her rights, elects to have the case proceed as a misdemeanor.6
In addition, the court may decide that the offense is an infraction. 7 If
the court so determines, and the defendant consents, the case must pro-
ceed as if the defendant had been arraigned on an infraction com-
plaint.' A conviction for an infraction, which has been reduced from a
misdemeanor, is not grounds for suspending, revoking, or denying any
license, nor grounds for revoking probation or parole.' The provisions
of Chapter 1270 are repealed on January 1, 1986, and the law will re-
vert to its pre-1981 status.' 0
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §17(b)(5). See generally Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d
119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140 (1971); Malone v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 313, 120
Cal. Rptr. 851 (1975); Larson v. Municipal Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 360, 116 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974); B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Proceeding before Trial §146A (Supp. 1978).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§17(b)(5), 872 (order holding a defendant to answer).
3. See CAL. STATS. 1976, e. 1070, §1, at 4809 (amending Cal. Penal Code §17).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §19e. The following crimes may be reduced: CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§25658(b) (sale of liquor to minors), 25661 (use of false identification by minors for
purchase of liquor); CAL. PENAL CODE §§330 (gaming), 415 (fighting or disturbance by loud
noises or offensive words that are likely to provoke immediate violent reactions), CAL. VEH. CODE
§§27150.1 (sale of defective exhaust systems), 40508 (failure to make timely appearance in court
after promising to do so), 42005 (violation of a court order to attend traffic school).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §17(d). Seegeneraly id. §19c (definition of infraction).
6. See id. §17(d)(1).
7. See id. §17(d)(2).
8. See id.
9. See id. §19e.
10. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1270, §5, at -.
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Criminal Procedure; violent felonies--enhancement of sentence
Penal Code §1170.1 (amended); §1203.08 (amended and renum-
bered).
AB 2123 (Boatwright); STATS 1980, Ch 132
(Effective May 28, 1980)
Support: Board of Prison Terms; Department of Corrections; Office
of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
Chapter 132 has been enacted to clarify and reemphasize the legis-
lative intent behind the 1977 revisions of the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act. I Under existing law, when a person is convicted of two
or more felonies, the length of that person's prison term may be en-
hanced2 only when the consecutive offense is a specified violent felony?
In People v. Harvey,4 the California Supreme Court held that the use of
a firearm5 was not an offense included within the requisite statutory
definition of "violent felonies".6 The court reasoned that allowing an
enhancement for use of a firearm in any case involving firearms would
render the statutory reference to spec!ied violent felonies unnecessary.7
The court extended this holding to also suggest that the infliction of
great bodily injury8 was not a statutory violent felony for purposes of
enhancemenit. 9
With the enactment of Chapter 132, the use of a firearm or the inflic-
tion of great bodily injury is now included within the list of violent
felonies considered for the imposition of enhancements with a
subordinate prison term.' In addition, Chapter 132 provides corre-
sponding changes in other sections of the Penal Code to highlight the
inclusion of firearm use and infliction of great bodily injury within the
list of specified violent felonies."
1. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 132, §§1, 4, at -. See also People v. Harvey, 25 Cal. 3d 754,
761, 602 P.2d 396, 400, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 700 (1979) (inaccurate statement of legislative intent
behind 1977 revision of Section 667.5(c)(8) of the Penal Code). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE
§667.5(c)(8); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishmentfor Crime §1025L (Supp. 1978) (aggre-
gate and consecutive terms for multiple convictions); 9 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1977
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 469 (1978).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a). See generaloy 25 Cal. 3d at 759-61, 602 P.2d at 399-
400, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c) (definition of violent felony).
4. 25 Cal. 3d 754, 602 P.2d 396, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1979).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c)(8). See generaly id. §12022.7.
6. See 25 Cal. 3d at 761, 602 P.2d at 400, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 700. But see CAL. PENAL CODE
§667.6(c)(8).
7. See 25 Cal. 3d at 761, 602 P.2d at 400, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667.5(c)(8). See generally id. §§254, 12022.5.
9. See 25 Cal. 3d at 761, 602 P.2d at 400, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.1(a).
11. See id. §§1170.l(), 1203.085(a), (b).
Pactflc Law Journal Vol 12
Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; residential burglary-denial of probation
Penal Code §462 (new).
SB 1236 (Beverly); STATS 1980, Ch 42
Opposition: Department of Finance; Office of the Governor, Legal
Affairs Unit
In an apparent effort to discourage residential burglaries,' Chapter
42 temporarily2 augments existing provisions regarding probation 3 by
denying probation to any person convicted of a burglary in the night-
time4 or of a felony burglary in the daytime' except in unusual cases6
when the interests of justice would best be served by granting proba-
tion.7 In addition, upon conviction of a misdemeanor daytime burglary
of a residence,8 Chapter 42 requires confinement in the county jail for
not less than 90 days nor more than one year except in unusual cases
when in the interests of justice probation may still be granted.' Chap-
ter 42 further provides that if probation is granted, the court must spec-
ify the reason for that order on the court record.'
1. Assemblywoman Sally Tanner, Newsletter, March 13, 1980.
2. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 42, §4, at - (effective Jan. 1, 1981, through Jan. 1, 1983, unless
deleted or extended).
3. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§1203.06(a)(1)(vi), 1203.06(a)(2), 1203.075(a), (b), 1203
.08(a), 1203.09 (denial of probation following conviction of subsequent felony, including second
degree burglary, while armed with a firearm). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES,
Persons Ineligible for Probation or Suspension of Sentence §§1056B-1056F (Supp. 1978).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§460(l), 461(1), 463. See generally id. §459; CAL. VEH. CODE
§635.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§460(2), 461(2).
6. See People v. Wilson, 34 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527, 110 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106 (1973) (discussion
of unusual cases).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §462(a). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Persons
for Whom Probation is Disfavored §1050A, Exception: Interests of Justice §1056A (Supp. 1978).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§459, 460(1).
9. Compare id. §462(b) with id. §1203(d).
10. See id. §462(b).
Criminal Procedure; sealing and destruction of arrest records
Penal Code §851.8 (repealed); §§851.8, 851.85 (new).
AB 2861 (Hannigan); STATS 1980, Ch 1172
(Effective September 29, 1980)
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Support: Department of Finance; Office of the Governor, Legal Af-
fairs Unit
In conjunction with existing statutory provisions,' Chapter 1172 es-
tablishes new procedures that allow any person who has been arrested
to petition a law enforcement agency for the sealing and destruction of
his or her arrest records2 if no accusatory pleading has been filed.3 A
copy of the petition will be served on the district attorney in the county
having jurisdiction over the offense.' Upon a determination by the law
enforcement agency that the arrested person is factually innocent, 5 the
agency, with the concurrence of the district attorney, will seal the arrest
records and petition for three years, and thereafter will destroy them 6
in accordance with standard procedures.7 The law enforcement agency
additionally must instruct any other local, state, or federal agency with
a record of the arrest to seal and destroy that record." If the law en-
forcement agency and the district attorney fail to respond to the peti-
tion by accepting or denying the petition within 60 days of either the
running of the relevant statute of limitations or of receipt of the petition
if the statute of limitations has already run, the petition is deemed to be
denied.9
When a petition is denied, the arrestee may petition the municipal or
justice court with territorial jurisdiction in the case to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing for the purposes of determining factual innocence.' 0 The
burden of proof originally rests with the petitioner to show that there
was no reasonable cause to believe that he or she committed the offense
for which the arrest was made;" if the petitioner meets this burden of
proof, the burden then shifts to the respondent who may introduce any
material, reliable, and relevant evidence to show that reasonable cause
exists to believe that the petitioner committed the offense for which he
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11361.5 (records destroyed in certain marijuana-
related offenses); CAL. PENAL CODE §§851.7, 1203.45; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §781 (records
sealed in certain cases involving minors). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §851.,5.
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8. See generaly Spivey, Right of ExoneratedArrestee to hare
Fingerprints, Photographs, or other Criminal Identication or Arrest Records Expunged or Re.
stricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972); Comment, The Rights of the Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of
Records Under California Penal Code §851.8, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1463 (1977).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(a).
4. Id.
5. See People v. Glimps, 92 Cal. App. 3d 315, 322, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (1979) (interpret-
ing factual innocence).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(a).
7. See id. §851.8.
8. See id. §851.8(a).
9. See id. §851.8(b).
10. See id.
11. See id.
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or she was arrested.' 2 The court, when ruling on the issue of factual
innocence, must find that no reasonable cause exists to believe that the
arrestee committed the offense for which the arrest was made,1 3 and if
the court so finds, it will direct the sealing and destruction of arrest
records according to the prescribed procedures.
14
When a person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading has
been filed, but no conviction has occurred,' 5 at any time after dismissal
of the action, the defendant may ask the court that dismissed the action
for a finding that the defendant is factually innocent.' 6 If it is so found,
the court may, with the concurrence of the district attorney, order the
records sealed.' 7 The presiding judge at the trial also may grant this
relief if the defendant is acquitted of the charge and appears to the
judge to be factually innocent. 8 In addition, the relief provided by
Chapter 1172 is available for an arrest deemed to be, or described as, a
detention, 19 but not for any offense categorized as an infraction.2 °
In presenting the evidence that the court will use to determine factual
innocence, the district attorney may present any relevant, material, and
reliable evidence, apparently, even if the evidence has been illegally
seized.2  However, if no previous evidentiary hearing or trial occurred,
the district attorney apparently may use any evidence in a hearing to
determine factual innocence, even if it was illegally seized.22 In re-
sponse to the possible use of illegally seized evidence at a hearing to
determine factual innocence, Chapter 1172 contains a provision that
automatically repeals those provisions that permit a person to petition
for sealing and destruction of arrest records upon the effective date of a
final court ruling under the United States or California Constitution
preventing any illegally seized evidence from being used to determine
factual innocence.23 If this occurs, that portion of Chapter 1172 that
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. §851.8(b).
15. See id. §851.8(c), (d).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. §851.8(e).
19. See id. §851.8(m). See also id. §§849(b), (c) (situations when arrest is deemed to be a
detention), 849.5 (record of release of detention), 851.6(a), (b) (certificate describing detention).
20. See id. §851.8(n). See generally Letter from Thomas Hannigan to Governor Edmund G.
Brown Jr., September 4, 1980 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(b). Compare id with id. §1538.5(d). See generally People
v. Bellici, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 598 P.2d 473, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979); People v. Glimps, 92 Cal. App.
3d 315, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1979).
22. See 24 Cal. 3d at 888, 598 P.2d at 479-80, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(o). See generally Letter from Anthony L. Dicce to James
Zupancic, May 14, 1980 (copy on file at Pacifc Law Journal).
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contains existing law will become operative.24
An arrestee who is declared to be factually innocent will be issued a
written declaration of exoneration, after which the arrest will be treated
for all purposes as if it had never occurred,25 and all pertinent records
and police reports will bear the notation "exonerated" whenever refer-
ence is made to the arrestee.26 Specific procedures are suggested for the
permanent destruction and sealing of the arrest records27 and for the
notification of the petitioner.28 However, no records may be destroyed
until the resolution of any civil action that the arrestee or a codefendant
has filed against the officers or agency making the arrest, and the sealed
records may be opened in that action.29 Any finding of factual inno-
cence, however, is inadmissible as evidence in any future action. 30 Fur-
ther, the arrestee has until January 1, 1983, to file a petition for relief
for arrests occurring up to five years before September 29, 1980.31 In
conclusion, the legislature has developed a plan to allow factually inno-
cent persons the opportunity to have their arrest records sealed and
destroyed. 32
24. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1172, §4, at- Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §851.85 with CAL.
STATS. 1975, c. 904, §1, at 2002 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(f).
26. See id. §851.8(h).
27. See 1d. §851.80).
28. See id. §851.8(f), (h).
29. See Id. §851.8(k). See generaly Letter from Thomas Hannigan to Governor Edmund G.
Brown Jr., September 4, 1980 (copy on file at Pacoc Law Journal).
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE §851.8(i).
31. See id. §851.8(1); CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1172, §6, at-.
32. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 1172, §6, at -
Criminal Procedure; mental health-commitment of criminal
defendants
Penal Code §§1026.1, 1370.3, 1374 (repealed); §§1026.1, 1026.3,
1370.3, 1370.4, 1374, 11105.1 (new); §§1026, 1026.2, 1026.5, 1367,
1370, 1370.1, 1370.2, 1372, 1375.5, 4029 (amended); Welfare and In-
stitutions Code §§6317, 6325.1, 7375 (repealed); §§6325.1, 6325.3,
7375 (new); §§6316, 6325, 6327 (amended).
AB 2751 (Nolan); STATS 1980, Ch 547
Support: Department of Finance; Department of Mental Health; Of-
fice of the Governor, Legal Affairs Unit
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Chapter 547 was enacted in an apparent attempt to revise and com-
bine provisions governing the outpatient status of mentally disordered
sex offenders,' defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity,2 and
developmentally disabled offenders Under existing law, when a de-
fendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and the verdict or find-
ing shows that the defendant was insane at the time the offense was
committed and that sanity has not been recovered, the court will direct
the defendant to be confined in a state hospital4 or other appropriate
public or private treatment facility, or to be placed on outpatient sta-
tus.' With the enactment of Chapter 547, direct outpatient status is also
provided for mentally disordered sex offenders and developmentally
disabled defendants as an alternative to commitment in a treatment
facility.6
Specifically, Chapter 547 provides for direct outpatient status, except
when the person is charged with specified felonies,7 and for transfer to
outpatient status from a treatment facility commitment8 if the follow-
ing conditions are met: (1) the defendant will not be a danger to the
health and safety of others while on outpatient status, and specified
officials determine that he or she will benefit from outpatient status;9
(2) the county mental health director is able to identify an appropri-
ate program of supervision and treatment;' ° and (3) after specified
notice and a hearing, the court specifically approves the recommenda-
tion and plan for outpatient status.I If the person is charged with, or
convicted of, any of the specified felonies,' 2 outpatient status is not
available until that person actually has been confined in a treatment
facility for at least 90 days after having been committed as an insane
person, developmentally disabled offender, or a mentally disordered
sex offender, 13 and outpatient status is subject to conditions similar to
1. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6300 (definition of mentally disordered sex offender).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026.
3. See id. §§1367, 1370.1(a)(1) (definition of developmentally disabled offender). Seegener-
al), id. §§1600-1614.
4. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §4001 (definition of state hospital).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1026(a).
6. See id. §§1370(a), 1370.4, 1600; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6316(a)(1).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1601 (including murder, mayhem, kidnapping when great bodily
injury is intentionally inflicted on the victim, robbery with a deadly or dangerous weapon or when
the victim suffers greater bodily harm, and any felony involving or posing a serious threat of death
or great bodily injury to another person). See generally id. §§1026, 1370(a)(I); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §6316(a)(1).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026.3, 1370.3; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §6325.3.
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1602(a).
10. See id. §1602(b).
11. See id. §1602(c).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1026, 1370, 1370.1, 1370.4, 1600, 1601(a), 1603; CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§6316, 6321.
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those required for granting direct outpatient status.14 In addition,
Chapter 547 specifies that in these cases (1) the recommendation for
outpatient status must be forwarded by the court to the county mental
health director, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel, 5 (2) the pro-
posed plan for outpatient supervision and treatment must be forwarded
by the court to the prosecutor and the defense counsel,' 6 and (3) the
court, within 15 judicial days of receipt of the proposed plan, must set
the matter for hearing and give notice to specified parties. ' 7 If the hear-
ing results in approval of the recommendations for outpatient status of
insane defendants or mentally disordered sex offenders, the county
mental health director or his or her designee will be the outpatient su-
pervisor and is therefore responsible for reporting to the court on the
status and progress of the defendant at 90 day intervals.' 8 Chapter 547
imposes an additional condition to be met prior to the approval of any
recommendation regarding a developmentally disabled offender. 19
These persons cannot be committed to a treatment facility or granted
outpatient status without first being evaluated at a regional center. 0 In
addition, the outpatient supervisor will be appointed by the person in
charge of the regional center.2 ' In no event may the outpatient status
exceed one year, regardless of the underlying mental condition of the
person.2 2 At the end of the one-year period, the court must conduct a
hearing that results in the discharge of the person from commitment,
an order to confine the person in a treatment facility, or the renewal of
the outpatient status. 23
A hearing regarding the revocation of outpatient status is required if
at any time during the outpatient period (1) the supervisor believes
that the person requires extended inpatient treatment or if the person
refuses to accept further outpatient treatment,24 or (2) the prosecutor
believes that the person is a danger to the health and safety of others.25
Chapter 547 requires that notice of the hearing be given to specified
14. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §1603 with id. §1602.
15. Seeid. §1604(a). See generally id. §1603(a).
16. Seeid. §1604(b). See generally id. §1603(b).
17. See id. §1604(c) (prosecutor, defense counsel, county mental health director, and director
of treatment facility).
18. See 1d. §1605.
19. See id. §§1370.4, 1600. See generaly id. §1370.1.
20. See id. § 1370(a)(2); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§4620-4628 (definition of regional cen-
ters).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1370.4.
22. See id. §1606.
23. See id.
24. See id. §1608.
25. See id. §1609.
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parties26 and allows for the confinement of the patient in a treatment
facility pending the outcome of the hearing.27 Finally, a hearing is re-
quired if the supervisor believes that the person has regained compe-
tence to stand trial, is no longer insane, or is no longer a mentally
disordered sex offender.28 Upon an affirmative finding, the court pro-
ceedings against the person may be resumed.29
Chapter 547 provides that, if a county does not have an appropriate
program for outpatient supervision and treatment,3 0 or the county re-
fuses to assume treatment responsibility, the court may order parole
treatment, not to exceed one year, for persons who have been commit-
ted to a treatment facility pursuant to a plea of insanity.3 The person,
however, must have been confined in the facility for at least 90 days
32
and must have improved to the extent that he or she is no longer a
danger to the health and safety of others and will benefit from parole.33
If the treatment is denied, no further recommendations for parole can
be made within six months of the previous recommendation. 34 If pa-
role treatment is granted, periodic progress and status reports must be
submitted by the parole supervisor and the medical director of the
treatment facility.35 The parole treatment is subject to revocation if the
person fails to meet the conditions of parole, requires extended inpa-
tient treatment, or refuses to accept parole supervision.36 In summary,
Chapter 547 provides for direct outpatient status in specified cases and
establishes standardized procedures for granting, supervising, and ter-
minating outpatient status, regardless of the underlying mental condi-
tion of the defendant. 37
26. See id. §§ 1608, 1609 (outpatient, county mental health director, and attorney of record
for the outpatient).
27. See id. §§1608, 1609 (body attachment), 1610 (if the person is confined, he or she is
entitled to judicial review and an explanation of rights).
28. See id.§1607.
29. See id. §§1026.2 (no hearing can be held until 90 days have elapsed from order commit-
ting a person to treatment facility or granting outpatient status), 1372, 1607; CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §6325.
30. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§1602(b), 1603(b).
31. See id. §§1026, 1611.
32. See id. §1611 (a) (period of confinement must have been at least three years if the offense
charged was punishable by death).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Seeid.§1611(b).
37. See generally id. §§1600-1614.
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Criminal Procedure; determinate length of commitment of
narcotics addicts
Welfare and Institutions Code §§3051, 3052, 3102, 3106, 3109, 3155,
3200, 3201 (amended).
SB 1878 (Presley); STATS 1980, Ch 822
(Effective July 29, 1980)
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Peace
Officers Association
Existing law provides that a person convicted of any crime, except
those specifically listed, I may be involuntarily committed to a narcotics
rehabilitation center if he or she is addicted, or is in imminent danger
of becoming addicted, to narcotics. 2 A person is not eligible for com-
mitment if the judge deems that person unfit because of excessive crim-
inality.3 In addition, the Director of Corrections may later exercise his
or her power to discharge a person if relevant circumstances indicate
that the person is not a fit subject for treatment.4 With the enactment
of Chapter 822, a person subject to civil commitment5 generally may
not be confined under a drug addiction program longer than he or she
would otherwise have been confined under *a criminal conviction.6
Under existing law the judge is required to adjourn the proceedings
and request the district attorney to file a petition for commitment if it
appears, upon conviction, that the defendant is an addict or is in immi-
nent danger of becoming an addict.7 Prior to the enactment of Chapter
822, if the written report of the examining physicians and the findings
of the judge at a subsequent hearing confirmed the defendant's addic-
tion, the judge was required to order commitment whether or not sen-
1. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3052.
2. See id. §§3050-3052. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, CiVil Commitment
ofAddicts §682 (Supp. 1978); Belton, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts in California- A Case
History of Statutory Construction, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (1968).
3. See People v. Wagoner, 89 Cal. App. 3d 605, 615-16, 152 Cal. Rptr. 639, 645-46 (1979);
People v. Flower, 62 Cal. App. 3d 904, 911-12, 133 Cal. Rptr. 455, 458-59 (1976); People v. Leo-
nard, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1131, 1136-37, 102 Cal. Rptr. 435, 439 (1972); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§3051.
4. See People v. Toscano, 69 Cal. App. 3d 140, 159, 137 Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (1977); People v.
Munoz, 51 Cal. App. 3d 559, 564-65, 124 Cal. Rptr. 322, 326-27 (1975); People v. Blackwell. 45
Cal. App. 3d 804, 811-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 768, 773 (1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3053, 3109.
5. See People v. Hernandez, 96 Cal. App. 3d 856, 861, 158 Cal. Rptr. 434, 437 (1979); People
v. Toscano, 69 Cal. App. 3d 140, 147-49, 137 Cal. Rptr. 893, 896-98 (1977). See genera/b' CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§3100-3111.
6. See CAL. WEE. & INST. CODE §§3051, 3 109(c), 3200(b), 3201 (c). But see In re Werden,
76 Cal. App. 3d 79, 80-81, 142 Cal. Rptr. 622, 623 (1977); People v. Gray, 65 Cal. App. 3d 220,
225, 135 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208, 209 (1976).
7. See People v. Nicholson, 64 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 31, 35, 134 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1977);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3051. See generally CAL. WEE. & INST. CODE §§3102, 3106.
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tence had been imposed.8 This commitment could have been for up to
seven years with a possible three-year extension.' In some cases a per-
son could be returned from the rehabilitation center to serve additional
time in prison even if he or she had spent time under the rehabilitation
program equal to the maximum sentence for his or her particular
crime.10 Chapter 822 provides that, before commencing commitment
procedures, the court must impose a specific sentence on the defendant
and suspend its execution." If the person sentenced is not admitted to
the rehabilitation program because of a medical determination of non-
addiction,' 2 a judicial determination of unsuitability,'" or is later dis-
charged,' 4 that person is to be returned immediately 15 to the court for
execution of the suspended sentence.' 6 In each instance, the court may
use its discretion to modify the sentence, dismiss the criminal charges,
or suspend further proceedings as warranted in the interests of justice. 17
Currently, if a defendant is convicted of one of certain specified felo-
nies,' 8 he or she is ineligible for commitment to the rehabilitation pro-
gram except in unusual cases." Chapter 822 expands the list of
specified felonies that mandate ineligibility to include (1) forcible sex
offenses, 20 (2) arson,2 ' (3) recklessly causing fires, 22 (4) causing
great bodily harm,23 (5) any crime that has either an enhancement or
no probation provision for use of a firearm, 24 or an enhancement provi-
sion for the taking, damaging, or destruction of property exceeding
$25,000,25 or (6) a conviction which results in a sentence exceeding six
years exclusive of any credit for good behavior.
26
8. See CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 359, §1, at - (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3051).
9. See CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1226, §2, at 3071 (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3201).
10. See People v. Gray, 65 Cal. App. 3d 220, 225, 135 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208, 209 (1976); CAL.
STATS. 1965, c. 1226, §2, at 3071.
11. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3051.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. §§3109(c), 3200(b), 3201(c).
15. Compare id with People v. Gray, 65 Cal. App. 3d 220, 223-24, 135 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208
(1976) (two-year gap).
16. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§3051, 3109(c), 3201(c).
17. See id. §§3051, 3109(c), 3200(b), 3201(c).
18. See id. §3052.
19. See People v. Morales, 49 Cal. App. 3d 732, 736-37, 122 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806; CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §3052(h).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1203.06.
21. See id. §451.
22. See id. §452.
23. See id. §§12022.7, 12022.8.
24. See id. §1203.06.
25. See id. §12022.6.
26. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3052. Compare id with CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1079, §96,
at 4891. See generaloy CAL. PENAL CODE §2931 (reduction of term for good behavior and partici-
pation).
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Under Chapter 822, a person involuntarily committed pursuant to a
felony conviction is given credit for time spent in confinement. When
the person has accumulated time equal to the sentence imposed, he or
she is returned to court and the sentence is deemed to have been served
in full, subject to the possibility of a parole period for anti-narcotic
testing.28 The maximum terms for commitment following misde-
meanor offenses are shortened from a possible ten years to 16 months,
and for noncriminal convictions from two and one-half years to one
year.29 The noncriminal commitment maximum applies to persons
within the rehabilitation program prior to July 29, 1980, as well as to
those persons subsequently committed."
Persons on outpatient status from a drug rehabilitation center who
abstain from the use of narcotics other than medically prescribed meth-
adone for a specified time may be discharged from the program.3
Chapter 822 shortens required abstinence periods for outpatients
(1) under noncriminal commitments from two years to six months32
and (2) for outpatients under criminal commitments from three years
to one year if the suspended sentence is two years or less, and from
three years to 16 months if the sentence is for more than two years.3
3 If
the person is discharged from the rehabilitation center and subse-
quently remains in custody under execution of the suspended sentence,
time served during commitment is credited to the sentence imposed? 4
A person committed to state prison upon release from the rehabilita-
tion program, however, is no longer eligible for a $200 rehabilitation
payment.35
Following the enactment of California's Determinate Sentencing
Act, the number of felon addicts committed to the rehabilitation pro-
gram decreased.3 1 In an effort to serve the shortest possible time, ad-
dicts frequently would choose a prison term with possibility of parole
rather than the lengthy seven year commitment.37 By shortening the
total commitment period and required abstinence time, Chapter 822
27. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3201(c).
28. Compare id. with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1226, §2, at 3071.
29. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3201(a), (b) with CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1226, §2, at
3071.
30. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 822, §9, at -.
31. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §3200.
32. See id. §3200(a).
33. See id. §3200(b).
34. See id. §3201(c).
35. Compare id. §3155 with CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 1006, §2, at 2001.
36. See CAL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS TASK FORCE STUDY: STUDY OF THE CIVIL ADDICT IN
RELATIONSHIP TO THE DETERMINATE SENTENCING LAW, 1 (1979).
37. See id. at 2.
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may make commitment a more viable possibility for addict offenders.38
Additionally, Chapter 822 brings the California Rehabilitation Center
program into conformance with the Determinate Sentencing Act and
other civil commitments.39 Furthermore, the legislature has specified
that the new determinate commitment provisions only apply prospec-
tively to persons who commit crimes on or after July 29, 1980.40 The
California Supreme Court ruled in In re Kapperman,41 however, that
the state may not arbitrarily classify persons for purposes of confine-
ment credit benefits without some legitimate public interest; otherwise
an equal protection violation will result.42 If the prospective limitation
is found to be violative of equal protection under the California and
United States Constitutions,43 a reviewing court may later strike the
impermissible limitation portion of the statute and extend the credit
procedures to all persons within the California Rehabilitation Center
program.' Application of the determinate commitment periods to per-
sons already committed might then shorten remaining time in custody
for some addicts.45
38. See id.
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE §11709(a); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5008.1; CAL. STATS. 1980,
c. 822, §10, at -. See general 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLA-
TION 282 (1977); Cassou, Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers
Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5 (1978).
40. See CAL. STATS. 1980, c. 822, §9, at -.
41. 11 Cal. 3d 542, 522 P.2d 657, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97.
42. See id. at 548-50, 522 P.2d at 661-62, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02. Seegenerali, J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515 (1978).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §7.
44. See In re Kapperman, 11 Cal. 3d 542, 550, 522 P.2d 657, 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102
(1975).
45. See id.
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